span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: Arial"span style="font-weight: normal; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration: none"font face="Times New Roman"span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: #39;Times New Roman#39;"This article presentsnbsp;an analysis of the matter of the ldquo;meaningrdquo; of life in terms of whether it should even be lived in the first place. It begins with an attempt at defining the question as an inquiry on the ema priori/em value of attention in general, and develops into an axiological reflection distantly inspired from Martin Heideggerrsquo;s notion of ldquo;care.rdquo; The main objective of the article is (1) to ldquo;answerrdquo; the question (or to proceed as if the question could be answered) objectively by ldquo;playing alongrdquo; with its naiuml;ve logicmdash;that is, by finding a basis for comparing the good that can be found ema priori/em in life (mainly, pleasure) with the good that can be found ema priori/em in death (mainly, the absence of pain)mdash;and, then, (2) to suggest why we have no good reason to feel dissatisfied with where this leaves us (i.e., possibly facing a certain specter of ethical foundationalism: the question of the ldquo;value of valuerdquo;). Its basic conclusion is, assuming we are committed to assigning value to life emin general/em, that we should be able to say that life is good emirrespective of /emany explanation for its existence./span/font/span/span

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