WHY THE WORLD IS ONE

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ABSTRACT: The understanding of the unity of the world—in the human and natural sciences, and the arts—has remained steadfast from ancient metaphysics to contemporary phenomenology: the world is one accidentally and necessarily, as true and false, potentially and actually, and categorically. But these four ways of being one can be traced back to how unity is or comes to be present and/or absent in anything whatsoever. If presence and absence, however, have their common root in implication, then this is how the world is (and why it must be) one—for unity is implied in everything that is.

KEYWORDS: Implication; Metaphysics; Phenomenology; Presence; Unity; World

If the world is, it is one. But the meaning of the one that the world is—this has yet to be clarified. For there are many ways in which the unity of the world can be, and be spoken and imagined, known and thought. But the unity of these ways of being one is implied by that which is sought. And it is only through a consideration of this unity, that we can begin to approach why the world is one, and the implications therefrom.

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNITY OF THE WORLD

And this is why Husserl begins the Ideas with the claim that ‘everything real joins together in the unity of the world’ (Hua 3/1, §1). For it is necessary to think our world—not just within the phenomenological tradition (as a modification and reestablishment of Greek metaphysics, as truly universal ontology), but in the
history of philosophy—as the ‘total unity of history, our history’, which ‘animated Greek philosophy from its beginnings’.

But what is the unity of this world? Or more precisely, how can unity join everything real—humans and animals, plants and stones, indeed the whole of nature, the motion and rest of the entire cosmos—together in the world? Or is there not another way of thinking unity, of going to the unity of the world itself? And one that has implications (intentional or not) for phenomenology, for our thinking of unity, for the natural and human sciences, and the arts, perhaps even for an entirely ‘unquestioned’ philosophical tradition?

The world, however, for Husserl, is not simply a matter for Logical Investigations; rather, it is a horizon—or more precisely, the world horizon, and in two senses: border and boundary. For Husserl takes the metaphor or analogy of the horizon

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2 Hua 6, 47. Science as (positive) concern-for ‘is directed at already known knowledge because knowledge is supposed to take over the task of securing existence [Dasein] and culture’; it is concerned about ‘acquiring what is true’—and science responds to our ‘human need’ for the security of ‘human Dasein’ by *θεωρεῖν*, that is, seeking the ‘absolutely valid lawfulness’ of ‘absolute certitude’, ‘certum as certum’, justified truth, self-evidence *qua* ‘universally binding’ on ‘all rational beings’, the mathematization-quantification-objectification of all beings; which is why all natural-sciences are human-sciences, and why the thematizations-interpretations-representations-translations of science ‘need to be undone’, reversed-destroyed-destructured-deconstructed (Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977, vol. 17, 60, 90-1, 101, 105, 221, 269; abbreviated hereafter as GA). The other kind of concern-for is (negative, privative) deficient: ‘neglect itself is something that is the concern of care. Neglecting can be characterized as deficient caring’ (GA 17, 90). Although we cannot deal with it in depth here, the parallels with Hegel seem obvious: in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* the lord and serf co-determine one another, and their truth lies in their relation, the unity of their concept, which is their beginning or origin (not simply their end), out of which their separation has been abstracted, insofar as they have always already passed over into one another—just as the *Meditations* ‘reduces a twofold being to a uniformity’; even if ‘the question concerning unity…is, for Descartes, not a problem at all’ (GA 17, 146, 244). So too with Husserl: subject and object co-determine each other, and their truth lies in their relation, ‘a certain circulus’, that is, in intentionality (which Hegel thinks as ‘work’, whereby the serf puts themselves into the object; and Heidegger reinterprets as (i) ‘concern-for’, whereby Dasein discloses itself as present-in and re-shaping that which it is concerned with, which re-shapes Dasein, and (2) ‘care’ as the origin of both concern for something and concern for nothing, or *Angst*, which discloses the being of care as that which makes them possible, which reveals being as their original opening, their *seinsmäßiger Ursprung*) (GA 17, 115, 173). The goal here seems quite clear: becoming ‘free from’ science, from its disciplines and its discipline (rigour), from ‘inherited possibilities and traditional types’, in order to—by returning to the ‘genuine being of care’ (which is neither its existence nor its essence)—become ‘free for’ human existence (GA 17, 112, 117). And as Husserl insists: ‘If Descartes had remained at the second Meditation, he would have come to phenomenology’ (GA 17, 268).
quite literally. On the one hand, the horizon *qua* border is always already present as that world *in which* we orient ourselves, live and die, experience and think, as the actual (in motion or at rest, fixed and finished or expanding and retracting) limit that surrounds us, and so that complete end or background (halo, shadow) within which phenomena (subjects and objects) manifest themselves, and come to presence as necessarily or possibly known, whether by the natural or human sciences, or used by the arts (Hua 3/1, §1). On the other hand, the horizon *qua* boundary is that world *to which* we relate as potentially unlimited, open and continually opening, temporally extended, as a promise of ever-new horizons beyond the horizon, other worlds beyond this one, as a middle or threshold-between (something like earth and sky, or here and there), especially insofar as we dream or imagine the unknown, even unknowable. And the world-horizon is the original unity of these two senses, border and boundary—for the world serves as the horizon of horizons, that which makes them both possible, the basis on which both may be constituted. Thus, if a world can be constituted as that *in which* and *to which* we relate (or correlate), it is because the world is the ‘total-horizon’, the ‘originally and constantly self-changing and yet remaining unitary horizon’; that is, the world-horizon or horizontal-world of any world whatsoever.\(^3\)

*Negatively*, therefore, there are not two or three, or multiple or infinite worlds; or other world beyond (like a Platonic idea, or kingdom of God), and no ‘world behind the world’.\(^4\) All ‘other worlds’ (such as the Greek or Roman world, the Copernican or Newtonian or quantum world, the material world of planet Earth or the immediately sensible world, or the sum of all objects therein, or of all these worlds, the *natürliche Welt, Sachenwelt, Wertaent, Güterwelt, praktische Welt, Zahlenwelt, arithmatische Welt, Dingwelt, Erfahrungswelt, Umwelt, phänomenologische Welt, Weltbewusstsein, Weltersfahrung, Lebenswelt*, etc.) are constituted out of the one and only world. And if there were more than one world, it would demand more than one word, but the plural makes no sense when applied to the world—rather every

\(^3\) Hua 39, 83. Landgrebe 1967, 52. As Geniusas notes: the world *qua* (transcendental) horizon is the wherefrom, wherein and whereto of experience; but the world is only a ‘figure’ of the ‘truly universal’ horizon, *Totalhorizont* (2012, 15, 53, 56, 177-223). In other words, the world is not the origin of the horizon; rather horizontality is the origin of the world; and the world can be given only because the horizon has always already been pregiven.

\(^4\) Landgrebe 1967, 48.
plural and singular presupposes the unity of the world-horizon (Hua 6, §37). So if the history of philosophy presents or represents the world as φύσις out there (whether thought as part of the whole κόσμος or not), transcendent and beyond me, ψυχή, somehow opposed to immanence; or as the mundus in which anima is deposited in a corpus; or as a res extensa to be sensed and thought by a res cogitans; or as an Objekt that stands over and against a Subjekt, or a thing-in-itself of which I can know nothing, even if I can intuit the forms of representation according to which it can appear and come to presence; or simply as a (subjective or solipsistic) result produced or created by my desire or mind or will (as in, for example, psychology), or by desire or mind or power itself, independent of me—then it is because the world is always already one. Thus, the world is not a world; rather, any world (and the multiplicity of worlds in which and to which we relate) can only be—and be called—a world, thanks to the world.

But positively, each and every phenomenon, is here in the world and because of the world. Subjects and objects, nature and culture, φύσις and τέχνη, real and ideal, facts and fictions, truth and falsity, essence and existence, temporal and atemporal, actual and potential, necessary and contingent, possible and impossible, all the different domains of (the natural and human) sciences and all areas of artistic creation, words and deeds, sense and nonsense, thoughts and things, appearing and disappearing, intuition and judgment, Erfahrung and Erlebnis—all this is here because the world is there. Whether we take up the natural or theoretical attitude, the actual-factual world or a potential-imaginary one, whether the spacio-temporal world of the empirical-material sciences (since Galileo) or transcendental philosophy, whether we investigate the world (as the intentional cogitatum) of conscious experience and appearance or ourselves as the cogito in our correlative (corresponding, differential) relation, or the world of random fantasies, or what belongs in and for itself to the world, that is, the eidetic universalities necessary to any world whatsoever—we can do our part because

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5 Or, ‘the world is the originally and constantly self-changing and yet remaining unitary horizon’ (Hua 39, 83). As Husserl admits, unfortunately or not, his early concentration on the theme of intentional-horizon (and the horizon of consciousness, subjectivity, figure-ground, background-foreground, etc.) left the world-horizon, and the unity of the horizon—which is not simply a metaphor—unthematized (Hua 3, Beilage 13, pp. 399-400).
the world is doing its part. Thus, the world—not just the ‘natural world as a correlate of consciousness’, nor merely ‘the spiritual world’ of the transcendental ego—is the unity that is there, doing its part, allowing for any possible relation or correlation therein, for every coming-together or (always already) belonging-together, and the constitution thereof; which is how each unification of ideality and reality (and any possible science of units) can be meaningful or investigated, as well as how we can then respond (ethically or not) to problems (such as global warming, the nuclear threat, pandemics, migration, human rights, pollution, economic inequality, political oppression, etc.) of the whole-world, Allwelt, at all.

The question of What the world is, then, has been answered: it is one, the unitary horizon. But the question of How the world is—this question remains. For how can the world allow the possibility—and actuality—of the difference between subjectivity and objectivity, mental and physical, ideal and real? Or, how can the world be given, come to presence as one, and serve as the unity of everything and anything that is—including us?

Husserl answers: the unity of the world is constituted. On the one hand, the

6 As Husserl writes: ‘If all given theoretic unity is in essence a unity-of-meaning, and if logic is the science of theoretic unity in general, then logic evidently is the science of meanings as such, of their essential sorts and differences, as also of the ideal laws which rest purely on the latter…All theoretical science consists, in its objective content, of one homogeneous stuff: it is an ideal fabric of meanings. We can go even further and say that the whole, indefinitely complex web of meanings that we call the theoretical unity of science, falls under the very category that covers all its elements: it is itself a unity of meaning’ (Hua 19, §29).

7 Hua 3/1, §§47, 53; Hua 4, §§48-64. For Husserl, the Kantian the world is an idea (1900, IV A334/III B391); unity is the law that regulates and guides the idea of world as schematization of the whole. On the one hand, as in Kant, idea here means: what cannot be known, but must be thought (as determinable, if not determined)—the transcendental ground or condition of the possibility of what I can know or hope, what I should do or not (1900, III Bxxvi; IV A771/III B799). On the other hand, (supposedly) going beyond Kant, idea is not simply regulative, but constitutive; or more precisely—idea is constitutive because it is (always already) regulative, and it is regulative because it is (always already) constitutive. Unfortunately, Husserl’s view of Kant as ‘psychological’, drives him to ‘correct’ a Deduction that is not in need of correction (Hua 3/1, §62); but this is not to mitigate phenomenology’s insights into the intentional structure of consciousness, or the discovery of phenomenological description as the possibility of a science of particulars. Additionally, it remains to be seen to what extent Hegel’s critique of Kant (qua a subjective psychologism unable to explain actual knowledge because of the thing-in-itself) would be equally applicable to Husserl (qua eidetic intentionalism unable to explain actual knowledge because of mere correlation). Ricoeur’s view on the world—as prior to language (and language games)—seems to follow Husserl’s: ‘Languages do not speak…Language is not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, because we are affected by situations, and because we orient ourselves comprehensively in those situations, we have something to say, we have experience to bring to language’ (Ricoeur 1976, 20-21).
world is not simply there before us, an abstract object or objects or objective reality, a thing (in itself) or things waiting to be found, like some rock spinning in space; nor is it merely made by us, as an artwork might be assembled by some artist, some god or gods; nor a composite or combination of μορφή and ὑλή born of nature, or determined through the ἔδοξος of some subject (or subjects) that, thereby, merely knows what it puts therein; nor is it just a fact or totality of facts (which determine the actual or potential state of affairs of what is or is not the case). Rather, the world is constituted as the horizon of subject and object, ego and non-ego, as the relation of subjectivity and objectivity. For that is what it means to be a world: being constituted as one.

On the other hand, as constitutive, the world serves as the unity in which and to which everything comes to be. Indeed, the world is constituted in its ‘constitutive becoming’ as that which makes the constitution of subject and object (and their relation, as well as any kind of investigation whatsoever, whether of the arts or sciences, meaning or act, experience or imagination) first possible (Fink 1966, 106). For esse is not simply percipi; being is not merely being perceived—nor is it simply there, or here, always already present, or the presence of the present—it is far more constituti, being constituted. And what is not constituted as well— this
is constituted *qua* non-constituted—for non-being, or nothing, is merely a way of being, μὴ ὦν a mode of τὸ ὦν, or ‘non-being *is* non-being’; and what is *not* perceived *is* not perceived, just as what is absent is present as absent: being is, and non-being is not (as Parmenides knows).  

The world then, is constituted-constitutive—but how so? Or more precisely, how is the world one so that it can constitute the difference between us, between us and the world, as well as the possibility of the identity of real and ideal, thought and thing, subject and object? And how does the world come to be as a continually constituted unity, so that we can possibly engage in any natural or human scientific investigation, or art, whatsoever?

As Husserl writes: ‘to constitute’ is ‘to announce oneself’, that is, ‘to make manifest’, *sich bekunden*. Or to paraphrase Schelling: constitution is how the world opens its eyes, and ours, realizes that it is one, that we are one with it, whereby we both see what we are—for as Goethe reminds us in ‘Epirrhema’: ‘Nothing is inside, nothing is outside; / For what is inside is also outside’ (1960, I: 545). Or, as Heidegger writes: ‘Here “constituting” does not mean producing *qua* making and fabricating; it means *letting a being be seen in its objectivity*’ (GA 20, 97)—for constitution reveals what is the case, and discloses worldly-beings as coming to presence in the unity of their world. Or as Sartre would have it: constitution is a ‘conspiracy’ (1936, 102) of subjectivity and objectivity. Or as Merleau-Ponty notes (after differentiating Husserl’s early intellectual or subjective understanding of constitution from his later, as well as static from genetic, passive from active): constitution is a kind of ‘primordial pact”; it is participatory or complicit explication *qua* determination of a positively implicit, pre-objective un conceivable, just as the unthinkable is unthinkable and that which is not, is not: you cannot ‘conceive them existing unconcealed’ (1974, §23). So it would be “a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in *being perceived*” (1974, §88). And although Husserl claims that Berkeley’s *percepi* does not include *esse* as a real component (Hua 3/1, §98)—this is precisely Berkeley’s critique of Locke, and ‘the phenomenological reduction consists in making every *esse a percepi*’ (Burnet 1990, 6).

11 Aristotle 1957, 1003b10; 1019b6. Or, as T.S. Eliot writes: ‘World not world, but that which is not world’ (Eliot 1963, 179).

12 Hua 3/1, 174; 15/434, 14/47. On ‘phenomena’ as what presents itself and/or comes to presence as ‘self-presenting in an absolute sense’ [Selbsteegenwart im absoluten Sinn], see Hua 13, §32.
indeterminacy—for to constitute is to collude in order to actualize and accomplish, thereby, to ‘explicate and articulate what was until then presented as no more than an indeterminate horizon’. Just as there is no gift (being) without a giver (and receiver), no thinker without a thought, or intuition (or consciousness) without an intuited (object of consciousness), the world is the constituted relation of subjectivity and objectivity—for this is how ideas are not merely ideal, but just as real (which is why—as Berkeley reminds Husserl, perhaps as much as Hume Kant—‘we eat and drink ideas’ (1974, §38)). In other words, the world is constituted as the unity of everything that is (necessary and possible thoughts and things, actual and potential objects and subjects, real and ideal)—for in being constituted, the world is explicated, revealed, as having been constituted. Thus, the constitution of the world is co-constitution—and there is (as Hegel reminds us) no lord without a serf, no parent without child, no love without lovers, no giving without receiving, which is why Husserl calls it (analogously) the playing of a duet, the Spiel of a Doppelspiel (Hua 8, 75; 11, 15)—for our relation to the world is constituted out of our difference from the world, a difference of the world from itself; but a difference or differential relation, an historical-temporal self-differentiation and ‘self-manifestation’, a ‘self-givenness’ which is constitutive for the being of the world, and our own, and for the unity of the difference between us and the world.

The world then, announces or shows itself, manifests or presents itself, as

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13 Merleau-Ponty 1945; 39, 254, 485.
14 Hua 11, §4; see 15/131, 287; Ms. C 2 3a; Ms. C 10 15b; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 491-492. More precisely—although we cannot go into this here—the constituting world constitutes itself. Like the subject, the world is self-constituting: ‘The constituting consciousness constitutes itself, the objectivating consciousness objectivates itself—and indeed, in such a way that it brings about an objective nature with the form of spatiotemporality’ (Hua 15/546). On the intersubjective constitution of the world, see Hua 1/166. Ironically or not, Heidegger argues that Kant already understood this: transcendental idealism is the unity of subject and object made possible on the ground of the transcendental schema of time (GA 3). And for Husserl, time is the universal form of all egological genesis (Hua 1, §37). It is Husserl’s understanding of the presence of unity (Hua 19.1, §2), as the essence of the indicative sign (and motivated judgment of the other), experienced as the unity of ‘sign and referent’ (Hua 19.1, §10), that Derrida takes as one of deconstruction’s first targets (1967a, 75)—especially insofar as signs (and language, mediation, repetition) are supposed to be foreign to Erlebnis, purely subjective lived experience (such as that of pain or death, which can only be mine), as well as to the pure self-preservation of inner monologue (Hua 3/1, §111).
15 Landgrebe 1949, 202; Wu 2018, 32.
being and having been constituted-constitutive, as the origin of the original unity of the relation of itself to us. In other words, ‘the origin of the world’—indeed, of all being—has been found: it is not, as onto-theology would have it, a matter of clarifying ‘beings by beings’ such as Nature or God or some other being, the cogito or absolute Geist; rather, the fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum is the world itself. ¹⁶ For the world gives of itself, gives itself to us, with us—and the world is only as us, and everything worldly (including us) only comes to be thanks to the world. And the world is neither a being (whether an object or substance, thing or some other kind of being), nor the beingness of being (whether a concept or idea, thought or some other avatar of beingness) because it is (as Heidegger grasps) the being of beings, or more precisely, the unity of the being of beings; that is, the original difference that differentiates and unites them both, the relation that makes the differentiation of world first possible (which is why the so-called ‘metaphysics’ that happens behind Husserl’s back is transcendental phenomenology). In this way, if the world is border or boundary, then it is because it is always already absolute, that is, the relational ground and differential foundation, reason and cause, the absolute ἀρχή of everything that is and comes to be. Thus, not just ‘we are the world’, but also ‘the world is us’; or we are one—

¹⁶ Fink 1933, 339, 342; Landgrebe 1961, 138; Lawlor 2002, 13-14. In other words, ‘the world remains immanent to the absolute’; or, the relation of (transcendent) world-horizon and world-phenomenon to world-origin (qua world-ground) is transcendental—for the absolute-world qua world-origin is not outside the world in some other world, not separate from the world-horizon, or from us; nor is it inside and contained in the world, like water in a glass. Rather, the unity of our relation to the world (qua transcendental knowledge) is only possible on the ground of ‘a higher unity’, that is, the unity of the originally transcendental world (Fink 1933, 357). It remains to be considered whether the world is a being, albeit a very special one, which would mean that Husserl clarifies beings by beings—and fails thereby, to clarify being itself, that is, what and how being, and the being of the world, is and is one. Then the world would merely be a secularized avatar of God (or the gods, spirit or absolute Spirit), which could compromise Husserl’s attempt to overcome onto-theology, which is perhaps why Fink writes: ‘Is man therefore the absolute? Not at all. But neither is the absolute a “transcendent” reality beyond man and not encompassing him. Separating and distinguishing them is as false as their direct equation. In place of a “transcendent” relation between man and the world-ground we must posit a “transcendental” relation which does not overlook man’s worldly finitude, frailty, and impotence, but which comprehends it as a constituted meaning, thereby taking it back into the infinite essence of spirit’ (Fink 1933, 383). Or, as Landgrebe argues: it is the ‘historical becoming’ of ‘the world, and not merely beings in the world’, which the tale or poem of the history of philosophy recounts—but unfortunately, ‘because Husserl, despite his criticism of Descartes, remains secretly stuck to the modern metaphysical concept-of-substance, his analysis of self-consciousness, and therewith the departure from metaphysics, remain incomplete’ (Landgrebe 1961, 153, 172).
and the origin of the world is the world itself, its self-originating, self-differentiating, self-presencing; or more precisely, the self-giving of the world that has also always already been given.

And yet, if the world is one—neither a being nor a unit, but the unity of beings—then what is this unity of the world? Or rather, if unity is the how of the world, the way the world is—and so, how it is constituted-constitutive—then how can unity be original? In other words, what is the relation between the sense of the unity of the world as finite and its sense as infinite? And does this not mean that, like Plato's second sailing: everything said about the world must be said, or said again—or rather, said first—about its unity?

Indeed, the world is one means the horizontal-unity of the world qua that in/to which we relate, whether in the sciences or arts or in anyway whatsoever, is grounded on (the absolute-unity of) the world itself. And this unity is not merely a contradiction or paradox, problem or aporia; on the contrary, it is the truth of the world, the being of its being. Just as a horizon is both in motion (always receding or approaching) and at rest (always there, present); or as a river is limited by its form, its banks and bedrock and surface, at stasis and in genesis, static and dynamic, fixed and flowing; so too, the world (as an absolute unity) is both structurally finite and historically infinite—for motion and rest, static and dynamic, fixed and flowing, are merely (constituted-constitutive) ways in which the unity of the world manifests itself phenomenologically.

On the one hand, the horizontal unity of the world is constituted on the ground of the world's absolute unity. And being is not simply the ground of the world's unity; rather, the unity of the world is constitutive for its being, thereby making the unification of beings first possible, as well as the relation or correlation between us and the world, our identity and difference. In other words, the unity of being and beings is itself constituted thanks to the unity of the world—for as Husserl insists: the world is the ‘universal permanent ground-of-being’, which announces itself as ‘the universal field of all our activities’, scientific or pre-scientific, speaking or acting, knowing or imagining, whether with regard to the real or the ideal, object or concept, interested or disinterested, empirical or transcendental, (sensuous) seeing with the eye or (eidetically) with the mind alone—although normally, in the natural attitude, we notice neither the unity of
the world, nor its concealed co-positing or correlation, nor its bond-to-being.\footnote{17} Thus, the unity of the being or non-being of things, the existence or non-existence of others, of us and our horizons, of our \textit{Eigensein} and \textit{Eigenwesen}, is constituted on the ground of the absolute unity \textit{(the presence or non-presence of the identification and differentiation—and so any predication or judgment whatsoever, whether in the arts or sciences) of the world} (Hua 3/1, §33).

On the other hand, the absolute unity of the world is constitutive for the unity of the horizon and us, for the inner-worldly difference of subject and object, of subjective being \textit{(Sein als Bewuβtsein, Sein als Erlebnis)} and objective being \textit{(Sein als Realität, Sein als Ding)}—as well as, for the possibility of transcendence, \textit{(truth as)} correspondence, correlation, knowledge, identity, as well as intentional analysis as the explication of the implicit, unfolding of the folded, clearing of the unclear.\footnote{18}

For as Husserl insists: \textit{ξυμβάλλειν εἰς ἑν} is only possible thanks to an original \textit{ἑν} \textit{(Hua 19, §31)}. In this way, absolute unity is constitutive for being: everything that is \textit{(objects and subjects, things of any sort)} emerges, arises, steps forward and announce itself \textit{qua} constituted \textit{(whether as it is or is not, as present or absent)}. Thus, it is the unity of being that allows the being of disunity, the different modes of being to be differentiated, the kinds of beings to be constituted, and the diverse modes of consciousness to diversify \textit{(and so to function)—for being is always the being of that which is constituted as being one, so knowable as one (adequately...\footnote{17} Husserl 1939, §89.\footnote{18} Hua 3/1, §42; Hua 1, §20. Methodological considerations are, therefore, addressed by the world's absolute unity: the phenomenological reduction reveals that which was always already the case, namely, that the world is the origin of thought, and so makes possible the thinking of the relation of thought to being, foreground to background, inner-worldly beings to their horizon, as well as the correspondence of concept and object, and the correlation of both the historically becoming and the static being of us and the world. If the concept of unity were developed inside the world, then it could not be applied to the world as a unity—but \textit{(to paraphrase Kant)} just because unity is grounded \textit{on} the world, and our knowledge of the concept of unity begins \textit{with} the world, neither means that it is to be found \textit{in} the world \textit{(like some kind of fish in water)}, nor that it arises \textit{out} of the world \textit{(1900, III B1)}). In other words, \textit{in/out and inside/outside} are prejudices derived from sensuous experience and may only metaphorically be used to criticize Husserl's method. It is far more that phenomenology—following Kant's transcendental philosophy—uncovers the condition of the possibility of all the arts and sciences \textit{(however reductive or reifying they might be)}: for example, \textquote{figuratively}, Darwin discovers the concept of natural selection \textit{(or survival of the fittest)} \textit{within} nature, and can rightly apply it to \textit{all} of nature, because it is not \textit{inside} nature at all, although he finds it \textit{in} his life-world; rather, natural selection is grounded \textit{on} nature, which arises \textit{out} of the natural world, and makes Darwin's discoveries first possible thereby.
or not), whereby knowledge as the unity of us and the horizontal unity of the world is first possible.

For Husserl then, ‘to be one’ means ‘to be constituted-constitutive’—and that is to announce the unity of the world, to make the world’s unity manifest, to show that the world is one, that we are one, to demonstrate that there is one world-horizon, and that our difference is one. Whether in this way or that, in one mode or another (so given, or like a seductive Reiz, or even pregiven), whether as the form of lawful regularity, as concept or object, category of inner or outer sense, copula or predicate, or as the present ‘state-of-affairs’ or one that comes to presence (like a tone), or a non-present state-of-affairs, so absent (like a remembered tone); whether more or less adequately given in experience (and in accordance with essential structures), or originally in pure intuition—the absolute world reveals itself to be and to have been one, to be becoming and to have become as one; which is why phenomenology (as Phänomeno-Logie) seeks ‘radical and universal knowledge-of-the-world’; that is, it reveals the ‘logos of the phenomeno-of-the-world’. Thus, to be constituted and to have been constituted as a unity, and to be (as well as to have been) the horizon for any possible investigation—this means to be one absolutely.

But being one—what is that? In fact, it is not what is, but how so. And things are one, or come to be one, because this is how being (the world and everything therein) is and comes to be, and so announces the unity of what is and has been; it is the act that actualizes and has actualized being (and the becoming of beings)—for the world is the unity of being, and being is always ‘Sein in der Welt’.

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19 Fink 1966, 139, 164, 170.

20 With respect to givenness, Kant writes: ‘In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge my relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us...objects are given to us by means of sensibility...because in no other way can an object be given to us’ (1900, IV A19/III B33; my emphasis). And then, with regards to intentionality, Husserl argues that it ‘makes no difference what sort of being we give our object’, as long as we give it some sort, whether real or ideal, present or absent, transcendent or immanent, possible or impossible (Hua 19, 427; my emphasis; see Hua 19.2, §44; 3/1, §24). On the deconstruction of the realist-idealist interpretation of Husserl and phenomenology as a metaphysics of the given qua pure and original presentation—albeit one that apparently ignores the constitution of givenness, and how being is constituted as given—see, Derrida 1967a, 50n; Benoist 1997, 228, 274.
being in the (one) world (Hua 3/1, §1, §142). As Husserl insists: being is a becoming, that is, a process in accordance with essential laws; and the unity of being is the ‘constant genesis [beständige Genesis]’ of everything that is (Hua 11, 339-340). So unity is the continuous becoming, Werden, of being—for phenomenology is not simply static Platonism (although it may find clues in a ‘structuralist’ philosophy of a priori essences); it is the concrete phenomenology of constant genesis (analogous to the Aufhebung of Hegelian history, but stripped of Geist and Idee) grounded in the self-announcing unity of the logical, egological, and ‘thorough-going teleological reason’ of the history of the absolute world which shows itself as the continuous Urprozess of active and passive Urkonstitution. Thus, the absolute-world is a ‘living’ unity, temporally and aspectually becoming what it is—and the ‘common root’ of the transcendental structure and historical genesis of the unity of the world is to be found in the absolute-continuity of the absolute-unity of the world (which is how it is one, especially if it is neither the necessary closure of finite totality, nor the opening of infinity possibilities, or impossibilities; but rather, the continuous flow of both, which is how it continues to be one).

And yet, what is continuous in the continuity of the unity of the world? In the constant constituted-constituting structure of world history; which is constitutive,

21 Hua 1, §37; Hua 6, Beilage III, 386; Derrida 1967b, 232, 246. The constancy of genesis, however, is—as I have argued in Unity and Aspect (Haas 2018a)—irreducible to a temporal determination; on the contrary, consistency is just as aspectual, the way in which genesis happens at anytime whatsoever.

22 GA 18, 311; see, GA 14, 17-18. Heidegger insists: ‘[the] being present of something[—]absence is constitutive for this presence, absence in the sense of deficiency, lack. This being-there in the sense of lack is completely its own and positive. If I say of someone: “I miss him very much, he is not there”, I precisely do not mean to say that he is not there, but express a quite particular way that he is there for me’. For what can be announced or made manifest, that is, the unity of the world—this must already have been somehow present (given as announceable, or ‘pre-given’ as open to manifestation, pre-announced or pre-manifested), at least if it is to be the constituted-constitutive horizon of subjectivity and objectivity alike (indeed, of anything and everything that is). And it is this privileging of presence that motivates Derrida’s deconstruction of the philosophy of presence, and its understanding of being or becoming as presence (to which he claims Husserl belongs): on the one hand, analogous to Augustine’s analysis of time, absence is only thought on the basis of presence, which clarifies how that which is not present can still be—by being-absent; on the other hand, the possibility of absence, non-being, nothingness, non-presence (as well as the non-now, past and future, the non-possible or impossibility, the non-self or other, heterogeneity, difference, etc.), is undercut or metamorphosed, translated or transmuted into presence—and there is no absence that is not a modification of presence; or absence is simply presence, a ‘strange presence’ as an even more devious means for maintaining the privilege of presence (Derrida 1967b, 242; Derrida 1972, 33-34).
thereby, for the horizon of any possible investigation of the world, whether in the natural or human sciences, or the arts? That is, what is the ‘common root’ of the constantly changing and remaining the same, the identity and the difference, the stasis and genesis, the structure and history, of the world—if there is one? Or more precisely: how is the world one? And how is the unity of the world to be thought and spoken? For the question here is not just with regard to the unity of the world—it is about the unity of the world.

THE UNITY OF UNITY

In fact, to answer the question of unity, Husserl looks to the Greeks, to Aristotle, to the ἑν ἐπὶ πολλῶν. And being neither a unit nor a collective of units (just as being is not a being) nor a collectiva of units; unity is neither an object nor a subject, neither simply objective nor subjective, neither merely abstracted from the real nor simply ideal (as in Platonism, or what Alexander of Hales understood as the ens perfectissimum), neither a Gedanken nor a Ding; nor is it just a predicate or (empirical or transcendental) concept, nor just a genus, nor the (highest) genus of genera. For unity ‘transcends all generic universality’

25 Heidegger GA 2, §1. Although Heidegger ‘still clings’ to the Husserlian problematic of the temporal horizon in Being and Time, he simultaneously exceeds it in the thinking of being at the origin qua absolute transcendens (GA 2, 51; Genesius 2012, 235). By the time of texts such as ‘Time and Being’, however, time is just as original as being—for they are both implications; and the origin of the problem of generating horizontal-difference has been traced back to the more original problem of the universality of origins (GA 14). Of course, as the reduction reveals, for Husserl (and Derrida, and all the other philosophers of difference), the origin—whether being or event, givenness or pregivenness, or some other origin—can only be, come to presence and show itself, in relation to the non-origin, non-being, non-presentation or absence and non-showing (just as there is no foreground without background, no ergon without parergon, no Erlebnis without Erlebnisstrom, no speaking without silence, no identity without difference, etc.). Thus, the originality of the origin is unoriginal (which problematises the very possibility of anything original whatsoever, especially insofar as it is framed or reframed—and thereby translated—into that which can be enframed, presumably at the cost of excluding everything beyond the frame, anything that cannot be translated into the language and logic of original-unoriginal). And the danger lies in thinking difference as original-difference (which Derrida seeks to avoid with différance), or horizon as origin (which Husserl tries to parry with genetic phenomenology and transcendental history, as Hegel did with dialectic)—for as Heidegger argues: difference as perduration (fulfillment, resolution) is present, Austrag west, and this is a circle, the
... it is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of beings; for the differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being and be one, but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentia; so that if unity or being is a genus, no differentia will either have being or be one. 26

Rather, unity is a universal principle through which the (natural-or scientific-, logical- or social-, home- or life-) world and inner-worldly beings are (statically or genetically) one, and so the horizon of our (subjective or intersubjective) experience (and the world itself), as well as how we see and investigate the unity of beings (in constant becoming), the one in the many, whether in the arts or sciences.

But then, how are we to think unity as universal? Aristotle answers: the study of being, of being \textit{qua} being, τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν, ontology—not onto-theology, which is

26 Aristotle 1957, 998b22-27. As Heidegger notes: the entire history of Western philosophy is prejudiced by a self-evident understanding and somehow motivated interpretation of being in terms ‘\textit{genus and exemplar}’ (GA 17, 114). And Husserlian phenomenology does not fare much better—for ‘all interest here is diverted directly to forming a fundamental-science and to considering beings from the outset with a view to their suitability as the theme of this fundamental-science. Being in the sense of \textit{being-a-region for science} misplaces more than ever the possibility of letting beings be encountered in their character-of-being’ (GA 17, 270). And phenomenology’s insight into intentionality (as our, the subject’s, consciousness’ way of being) blocks it from thinking us prior to this interpretation: ‘from the outset, Dasein cannot be \textit{primarily} taken in any sense at all through the phenomenon of intentionality. From the outset, the phenomenon of intentionality is directed at seeing something as directed towards something’—and fails, therefore, to allow ‘Dasein \textit{qua} Dasein to encounter itself’, that is, to experience how it is, its existence, its way of existing, of coming-to-presence (GA 17, 284, 287). For example, according to Heidegger, unlike fear, Angst is precisely not related to something, some intentional object; on the contrary, it is a way of being threatened by nothing (and so, by the uncanny, by the question of existence itself, even if we defend-ourselves-against-ourselves). In sum, ‘Dasein is the sort of being that, if it is to be determined in an ontologically adequate way, basically cannot be determined as a being that one \textit{has}, but instead as that very being that one \textit{is}’ (GA 17, 287). Of course, for Husserl, non-intentional consciousness is an abstraction-reification, a (somehow motivated) interpretation—and a non-relational, isolated, empty consciousness would not be consciousness, just as a \textit{cogito sans cogitatum} would be no \textit{cogito} at all. Thus, Blumenberg can argue that being able to have something, without having to be it, constitutes the very power and value of (non-canibalistic) consciousness as ‘the organ for not-devouring the world, and still not failing to possess and enjoy it’ (1987, 22).
why Book IV of the *Metaphysics* remains free from any real discussion of the divine νόησις νοήσεως νόησις as it appears in Book XII—is the clue to any understanding of unity, unity *qua* unity, henology:

Now, if being and unity are the same and are of one nature in the sense that they are implied by one another as principle and cause, but not in the sense that they have the same definition (though it makes no difference even if we suppose them to be like that—in fact this would even strengthen our case); for ‘one man’ and ‘man’ are the same thing, and so are ‘existent man’ and ‘man’ and the doubling of the words in ‘one man and one existent man’ does not express anything different (it is clear that the two things are not separated either in coming to be or in ceasing to be); and similarly ‘one existent man’ adds nothing to ‘existent man’, so that it is obvious that the addition in these cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing apart from being; and if, further, the substance of each thing is one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from its very nature something that is—all this being so, there must be exactly as many species of being as of unity.27

Indeed, being is one, but unity also is. So unity is thought to belong to being as much as being to unity—for being and unity imply one another. And this is why, in the *Metaphysics*, the entire ontology, the study of being (Bk. IV, Γ; Bk. VII, Ζ; Bk. V, Ch. 7), is repeated as henology (Bk. X, Ι; Bk. V, Ch. 6)—for if ‘being is spoken in many ways’ (1003b5), then so too, ‘unity is spoken in many ways’ (1052a15). Being is one and unity is, and unites beings, which is why: not only real or true being, being itself, essential being, τὸ ὄντος ὀν; but each being, τι, particular things—these too, are always also one.28

And as Brentano reminds us, therefore, if there are four senses of being—all related πρὸς ἕν to being itself, οὐσία, presence as the ‘common root’, the *ens commune*—then there are four senses of unity.29 So the essential modifications of being *qua* being are also the essential modifications of unity *qua* unity. Or more precisely, there are not just many ways of speaking or thinking about being and unity (Aristotle 1957, 1003a33); rather, being and unity are one, which implies that

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27 Aristotle 1957, 1003b22-54; 1053b25. For Fink (1990, 149), Husserl’s failure to consider the being and essence, *Wesen*, of the unity of the world is striking: ‘The astounding thing is that a philosophy, which begins with the proclamation that it wants to observe everything in an unbiased and presuppositionless way, takes the peculiar *Wesen* of the world so little into consideration’.


29 Brentano 1862, 6; Heidegger, *GA 17*, 51; Owens 1951, 118-123, 259-273.
they come-to-presence and go-out-into-absence, manifest and announce and show themselves, in four ways: accidental, true, potential-actual, categorical (συμβεβηκός, ἀληθὲς, δυνάμει-ἐνέργεια, κατηγορία).

First, accidental unity is not necessary, but merely happens to be the case, *quid facti*, not *quid juris*: if I am just, I may be musical and a house-builder, but neither because I am just, nor because I am musical, nor because I am a house-builder; so that these qualities come to presence as one, but are neither inseparable from each other, nor from my substance or essence. Or, my body may be one, but there is no *a priori* reason for its unity, and it is perfectly possible that it could be otherwise, now or in the past or the future. In this sense, there is no necessary connection between the world and its unity—for not only is the world divisible into parts and wholes, presumably governed by one law (or a unity of laws, which could be otherwise); but it is perfectly possible that, one day, the continuous becoming of the world comes to an end, that the world ceases to be, or that it no longer continues to be a whole or part, or wholes and parts.30

Second, true unity is not just the corresponding or correlating of an object that is judged or understood, presented or represented, determined or defined, as the same as, or identical to, a (subjective) concept (Aristotle 1957, 1027b20); rather, it is the relation itself (*ὁμοίωσις*, *adaequatio*), the truth of the inseparability of concept and object, that which lets correlation correlate (or be constituted as correlative) and correspondence correspond. A thing itself, a human being or the world, is one not because I assert it to be so, nor because it agrees with my concept (of, for example, ζῷον λόγον ἔχον—thus, not because it is a living being that has reason or language, *anima* or animation); rather, if it agrees with my concept or judgment, it is because truth is (always already continuously present as) the unity of concept and object (whether simple substance immediately grasped by pure seeing, or revealed over time as adumbrated), knowledge and known, experience and experienced, sign and referent, intuition and intuited, the inseparability (at

30 On *unum per accidentem*, see for example, Leibniz 1875-90, 2:76, letter from 28 November/8 December, 1686. Later, Leibniz rethinks actual unity as unity *per se* (a sheep, not a flock of sheep), that is, genuine or substantial unity (independent of external union), which is also that of the monad or Cartesian soul (1875-90, 2: 76, 120; 4: 395); and the unity of a body is not merely extention (and divisibility, so flexibility and changeability, as Descartes might have it), but the continuous/repetitive aspect—at one and the same time—of primary matter (4: 393-4).
least in truth) of what is thought with the thought thereof—and ignorance, error, nonsense, falsehood is their privation, separation, disunity. In this way, the world is truly one insofar as its unity manifests itself to be and to have been continuous, a constant presence, which is how it continues to reveal itself as being and having been one, announces that it is inseparable from itself, and shows itself as indivisible in itself (and how it always allows itself to be divided in thought, subjectively, whether in scientific knowing or for practical reasons or in the arts; and how it can come to presence as objectively differentiated into objects or events, or inner-worldly beings and their worlds, us and our horizons). For the true unity of the world lies in the continuity of its genesis, in what is continuous (being) in its becoming, or how the world continues to be one.

Third, unity in the sense of potential and actual are not merely the logically possible and necessary (which does not violate the law of non-contradiction, which would be the impossible)—rather, they refer to ways of being one. So the unity of the potential comes to presence (discontinuously) as not-yet-present, but far more continues to be absent, to be one in absence; while the unity of the actual is continuously present as one, insofar as the τέλος is accomplished in the work, ἐν-τελέχεια, in the act, ἐν-έργεια, (Aristotle 1957, 1048a18-36). In other words, being one, a unity, is not just a state (like some kind of static structure); it is an activity or acting (or working), and so an action or work open to investigation by the sciences or arts. If potential and actual then, can be predicated of nouns (or be determined as qualities of things, objects) and verbs (or ways of acting), then it is because being-one is, potentially and actually, both what a thing is and how it is, that is, its way of being and becoming. So, on the one hand, a thing (like a stone) is actually one, and one of those things that we see and investigate and know to be indivisibly one, that manifests itself as the act of being a stone; but a stone is potentially a statue, and continuously inseparable from its potential (which is constantly present), even if it actually comes to presence in the act or event of being carved into what becomes a statue, in the event that works the stone up into the work of art. On the other hand, in seeing, the seer is continuously one with the seeing, actualizing the action in the act and inseparable therefrom, and the deed is the actualization of the end, so that in seeing, we see and have seen (just as, in understanding, we understand and have understood; or
in living well, we have lived well)—but in actions such as dieting (learning or treating illness), the doer is discontinuously one with the end (knowledge or weight-loss), an end which is not yet present in the activity. And the unity of the world is potential and actual in both senses: on the one hand, the world is potentially one insofar as its constitution is in constant historical genesis, continuously being realized in correlation, in the process of becoming, of coming to presence and going out into absence; on the other hand, the world is actually one, an indivisible absolute unity, and the unity of the world is accomplished insofar as it is, so that even in becoming one, it is and has been one, or in coming to presence its unity is and has been present. Thus, potentially the world is not yet one, but constantly being constituted-as and constitutive-for its unity (and inner-worldly units, objects and concepts, gifts and givers, as well as for the worlds of the arts and sciences) on the ground of original difference, the correlation of us and world; and actually it is and has been one, the absolute unity of itself and its other, the unity of its identity and difference, its becoming and being, its genesis and structure, which is how it can show itself as one, even as it is and becomes another.

Fourth, unity in the sense of the categories is not just one category among others, nor a genus of species (category of categories); nor is it merely a function of the subject (form or matter of judgment, statement, or predication) nor simply the shape of the object or concept—rather, unity means being one in any category whatsoever; so, in quality or quantity, essence or relation, place or time, action or affection. But the relation between unity and the categories is neither equivocal nor univocal nor analogical; rather, every category is one in relation to, πρὸς ἕν, the unity that is implied (qua terminus) in each one. For the unity of every unit (and the being of each being) necessarily implies (πρὸς) unity (ἕν). And that is how a category can be implicated in what it categorizes; how health can be predicated of, or constitutive for the healthy, for everything healthy implies the unity of health; or how the definition, λόγος or ὁρισμός, of health can imply that to which or in which anything healthy is directed as a border or boundary. Thus, unity is not only a category, nor merely what allows each category to be one; it is just as much what is implied by everything that is—which is how the world (and everything inner-worldly) can be, or come to presence, in accordance
with the categories, categorized; so that the categorical unity of the world can manifest itself consistently, and be investigated by the natural and human sciences, and the arts, and announce itself as what is continuous about the world, insofar as it continues to be one.

And so there are four ways in which the world is one: accidentally, unnecessarily, but being one nonetheless; truly being one, how the world is, or its way of being given and always already having been given as one; potentially being one, and so becoming what it is, one, and/or actually being one and so also having been one; categorically, that is, as coming to presence or present as constituted in accordance with the categories of anything that is.

But the unity of these four senses of unity, the one in many, is irreducible to anyone of them—it is neither simply accidental or true, nor merely potential or actual or categorical. But nor is it all of them taken together, gathered into a whole of which they parts, or a genus of which they are species, or a totality of totalities. Nor is unity just a unit. Rather, unity is that toward which they are all directed, πρὸς ἕν, that which is necessarily implied by each; and from which they all come, which implies them all, just as it is implicated in each. In this way, unity is inseparable from any of the senses of unity, and from itself, and from each unit, or unified being, even things such as humans and stones, ideas and concepts, words and deeds, one world or another, what is inside a world and out, as well as the borders and boundaries of any world whatsoever—although we can, in the natural or human sciences, or the arts, separate the inseparable, that is, abstract units, their identities and differences, relations and correlations, or cut-up and divide the indivisible. But the task is, far more, to think the unity of unity, of the unity implied by any way of thinking unity—for just as beings imply (πρὸς) being, units imply unity; and just as being is implied in beings, unity is in units (which implicates it, thereby, in how each is one).

So, what is this unity—that which Husserl thinks as absolute-unity (1939, §92)—such that it can be the unity of the world? What is the unity of unity—if it is neither psychological-cognitive nor social-political normativity, neither abstract empirical-material rules nor merely formal-logical laws, neither just real nor ideal, outer (derived from sensation or perception or experience of external things, objects) nor inner, historical nor structural, neither just static nor genetic,
nor some permutation or combination of both—so that it can be the unity of any
unity whatsoever, whether accidental or true, potential or actual or categorical;
and so that each unit (the world, any world, inner-worldly unities, us, our
horizons, closed or open, at motion or at rest, our arts and sciences, experiences
and feelings, dreams and thoughts), and unity itself, can be one?

Aristotle answers: the unity of unity is indivisibility, ἄδιαιρετος. So the unity
of the world consists in being indivisible; and therefore, inseparable from itself.
For it is this unity, which is the unity of metaphysics qua ontology (or rather, onto-
henology), is itself neither a genus, such as unitariness or wholeness or oneness;
nor a unit, such as part or substance, or whole, or whole of wholes—although it
is that from which the separation of units and substances (like the mortal and im-
mortal, the finite and the in-finite, the closed and the open, part and whole,
totality and non-totality, species and genera; and their unification or reunification,
their taking-part or participating, relating or correlating, that
allows the world to be separate, χωριστός, from us, from other inner-worldly
beings, and from other worlds) comes. In other words, indivisibility is the unity
of unity, which is how it can show itself, announces itself, make itself manifest,
come to presence as the separability and inseparability, divisibility and
indivisibility, of anything that is (even unity itself). Thus, what is continuous in
the unity of the world, the ‘common root’ or ‘one in many’ of the continuous
structure of world-history and the continuous history of the world’s structure, as
well as any possible investigation thereof, whether in the natural or human
sciences or the arts—this is indivisibility, that is, the unity of being.

UNITY AS IMPLICATION

Unity then, means indivisibility. And so, the history of philosophy as onto-
henological metaphysics announces, in a certain way, what is (and has been): not
only is the world one, but it must be one, if it is to be, in anyway whatsoever; and
what is continuous about (the being and becoming) of the unity of the world is

31 Aristotle 1894, 1102a31; 1957, 1052b16; Aubenque 1962, 36n2, 305-310. It is this irreducible unity of
unity, this implied unity, that Aubenque names: ‘original unity [unité origininaire]’ (1962, 496).
that it is indivisible. But how so?

In fact, with regard to the world, the indivisibility of its unity shows itself as inseparable. Or, if the world is one—and it is one, if it is at all—and the world is indivisible in its being; then the being of the world is inseparable from the world. For the world is one because its unity cannot be separated from what is one, namely, the world (which is how we can also think and experience it as ideally separate, as pure εἶδος, pure ἰδέα, pure possibility, pure a priori; or split it up into parts and wholes, whether finite or infinite, limited or unlimited, in motion or at rest, in order to investigate or use it as abstractly separate, whether in the sciences or arts). Thus, from Aristotle to Husserl, unity continues to be understood in accordance with the way of thinking that ‘animated Greek philosophy from its beginnings’—not only in terms of indivisibility, but just as much, in terms of inseparability.

And like indivisibility, inseparability manifests itself accidentally, truly, potentially-actually, and categorically. First, if the unity of the world is accidental, if the world (and our experience thereof) shows itself as divisible, or not; then it is because divisibility is inseparable from the real world, which is how things in the world, inner-worldly beings, can be continuously divided and joined, stopped and started, presented and represented. Second, the truth is inseparable from what is true: the unity of the world cannot be separated from the world—on the contrary, truth is inseparability (the being one of concept and object, empirical and transcendental, res cogito and res extensa, thought and thing, and so the ‘common root’ of correspondence or correlation, adaequatio or ὁμοίωσις, true and false, right and wrong, accuracy and inaccuracy, honesty and lies). Third, potentiality and actuality are inseparable from the world: on the one hand, the world is inseparable from itself, at least if it is a potential or actual world; on the

32 This is why ‘phenomenology properly carried through is the truly universal ontology’ (Husserl 1939, §93b), and not just a method for intuiting essences; and it is the truly universal henology—for it is metaphysics (or first philosophy, φιλοσοφία πρώτη) qua onto-henology. As Husserl insists: ‘Finally, I wish to point out—so as to avoid misunderstandings—that phenomenology excludes only that naive type of metaphysics which operates with absurd things in themselves, but it does not exclude metaphysics altogether’ (Hua 1, 38-39). Indeed: ‘Phenomenology is anti-metaphysical insofar as it rejects any metaphysics that moves in empty formal substructions’ (Hua 9, 253; see Hua 5, 141); but it is ‘pro-metaphysical’ insofar as it moves in the full concrete constitution of the unity of the world.
other hand, the world is inseparable from its act, whether it is in the process of becoming what it is or is not—or if it has become that which it is and has been, one, a unity.\textsuperscript{33} Fourth, the world (and everything therein) is inseparable from the categories—and each category, being one (like anything categorized from which any category is inseparable, including the world) is inseparable from the world (and everything therein). Thus, unity is inseparable from the world, from its way of being and becoming—for unity is “necessary and universal in the strict sense”, “admitting of no possible exception” (Kant)’ (Husserl 1939, §89).

But how is unity (understood as indivisibility and inseparability) in the world? Does it merely participate in some kind of (other or different, somehow separate or separable, ‘Platonically speaking’) ideal unity? Or does unity determine every kind or species of unit? And how is the unity of the world to be thought? Or what must unity be, so that it can be (and be constitutive of) the unity of the world? In other words, how is unity—as necessary and universal in the strict sense—to be thought?

Perhaps a hint from Aristotle: ‘being and unity are the same and of one nature \[τὸ ὁν καὶ τὸ ἕν ταῦτα καὶ μία φύσις\] as they imply one another \[τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν ἕλληλοι\].’\textsuperscript{34} But what does that mean? To imply? To be implied? So, to implicate or be implicated? Or more precisely, to be an implication?

In fact, Aristotle is quite clear: an implication is not a λόγος; it is not definition or meaning, value or measure, explanation or argument, expression or utterance, speech or subject-matter, word or law—and it is not ground or abyss, neither presence nor absence, neither happening nor non-happening. To imply is not λέγειν; it is neither to reason or calculate, nor to give an account or narrative, nor merely to speak or to think, nor just to lay-out or gather-up. Rather, implication

\textsuperscript{33} The attempt to think the unity of horizon and world on the ground of one of the (somehow privileged-preferred) four senses of unity (and being), such as potentiality-actuality, is bound to fail (Walton 2003, 2; Gurwitš 2010, 399n84); rather, we must seek the unity of all these senses—that is, indivisibility—out of which they come, and on the basis of which horizon and world can be one at all (just as we have sought to think the unity of being as \ouσία understood as presence—not simply substantia).

\textsuperscript{34} Aristotle 1957, 1003b22-23; see also, Derrida 1972, 40, 67; Haas 2018a. And not just onto-henology; but rather, onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology understood as the study of being and unity, time and aspect. Interestingly, it seems that Heidegger thought time as the how of being as early as 1923-4—for he writes: ‘Dasein is temporal…past-present and future are not dimensions shoved next to one another, but instead determine the how of Dasein in a unitary way’ (GA 17, 319).
is the way that unity is, the how of unity—and how being is, insofar as being and unity are the same. Thus, implication is (not just a what, but) how unity (and being) is, and is inseparable from the world; as much as how, being one, the world is indivisible. But what does that mean?

Perhaps a few clues, a few clues to implication, a few clues for thinking the unity (and being) of the world, and unity (and being) itself. For unity and being are the same, and are one thing, insofar as they imply one another. So everything said, here and now, about being must be said again, or also already, about unity—and about the (being and) unity of the world. Three clues: (1) a clue to the unity of inner-worldly beings, (2) a clue to the unity of inner-worldly beings and the world, (3) a clue to the unity of unity.

The first clue, from Homer, to the unity of inner-worldly beings: at the end of the *Iliad*, the dead Patroclus comes to Achilles—or more precisely, he neither comes nor fails to come, neither comes to presence as himself nor remains in absence. Patroclus is neither here nor there; being dead, he is neither simply the same (as when he was alive, a living presence), nor merely different; he neither simply appears and makes himself manifest, nor does he fail to appear and refuse self-manifestation. For the (dead) friend has the same look and sound, form and shape, ἕιδος—but he is not the same; or he is different, but not different, like but unlike. And this is why he remains distant, τῆλε, neither far nor close, neither real nor ideal—for lacking life (heart, mind, will, passion, φρήν), he is ungraspable; or lacking presence, he is almost nothing, like smoke, vapor, καπνὸς—but he is not nothing (Homer 1920, 23.72, 104). For the dead (friend) is a third thing, tertium datur, τρίτον τι (Plato 1995, 250b8); and Homer names this—not just soul, ψυχή, but εἴδωλον, that is, a vision or apparition, image or illusion, phantom or spirit, dream or ghost (Homer 1920, 23.103). In other words, coming back to haunt him, the friend’s way of being (and having been) is revealed: (being) alive, Patroclus was present, actually or really or truly here; or absent, so potentially present there; but (being) dead, Achilles’ friend is neither here nor there, neither actually (or even potentially) present nor absent, neither really or truly (simply) now with or by him nor without or away and beyond (or above or below)—for the ghost is the clue to the neither/nor of friendship; and cutting both ways (like Peirce’s arrow,
1931-5, 4.264), death shows how the dead (friend) is, was, continues to be, implied in the life of the living (although untranslatable—at least without a certain kind of privileged and privileging violence—into the language and logic of presence and absence). For, on the one hand, because like giver and receiver of the gift (or parent and child, master and slave), no friend is alone (an island, monad, unit), purely separate or simply separable individual, object, being—so, implied by one another (a *Doppelspiel* or original difference), friends show themselves as inseparable; and Aristotle should not have said, ‘O friends, there is no friend’, ὑπάρχουσα φίλοι οὐδεὶς φίλος—but rather, having ‘eaten salt together’, ‘O friends, there are only friends’ or more precisely, ‘O friends, no friend’—for friendship is a relation or correlation of inseparability. And on the other hand, friends show themselves as separable: difference and discontinuity is as essential to friendship as identity and continuity—for each friend is implicated in the other, in their life and thought, feeling and imagination, things and world, which is how each of us can carry ‘the voice of the friend’ with or by us, especially insofar as friendship is not just a matter of space or place, nor merely of opposition to enmity. For the ‘common root’ of the friend is implication—but that which is implied can never just come to presence, nor remain in absence; it only fails to manifest what cannot be manifested, cannot reveal what remains concealed. In this way, the friend is neither just separate (nor inseparable) from me; or if we manifest ourselves as separated, it is because our separation comes out of our unity, which is how our friendship is one. And being a friend, being one of those things we call friends, means being implied: the other implies me, is implicated in me, in my words and

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35 Aristotle 1894, 1156b28; Diogenes Laertius 2013, V.21, 251-2; Derrida 1994, 17, 201, 221. As Bernet (1990, 20) argues: the fundamental problem of phenomenology is that Husserl is ‘unable to account for the gift’, that is, for the gift of the world to the subject, and of the subject to the world—or rather, for the givenness of the gift in general. Heidegger’s response is well known: being (as the *Es* of the *es gibt*) gives itself, gives of itself as the possibility of being and beings (such as subject and world). But Heidegger is thereby unable to account for how so, for how being gifts, that is, for how being (like unity) is implied, an implication.

36 Heidegger GA 2, §34. As Montaigne writes: ‘Si on me presse, continue-t-il, de dire pourquoi je l’aimais, je sens que cela ne se peut exprimer qu’en répondant: parce que c’était lui; parce que c’était moi’ (1595, 1.28). Or, as Nietzsche writes on the hermit: the friend is a third, neither self nor reflected-self, but other than both; which is why Zarathustra insists: ‘I do not teach you the neighbor, but the friend. The friend shall be your festival of the earth and an anticipation of the overman. I teach you the friend and his overflowing heart’ (1967, ‘Vom Friunde’ and ‘Von der Nächstenliebe’, Also sprach Zarathustra, Bk. I).
deeds, in what and how I am what and how I am, in who I am or become or have been; I imply the other; so the friend can be mine, come to presence or be (and have been) as a gift given to me, announce a present present to me, or absent from me, relate or correlate to me. Thus, insofar as we (friends) are one, we are implicated thereby; and the unity of friendship, if there is one, is how the experience or idea, givenness or constant, of friends and friendship can come to presence and be present or go out into absence and be absent—for the ghost of Patroclus is a clue to how the friend has always already only ever been implied.\textsuperscript{37}

The second clue then, from Fink (his language or language itself), to the unity of beings and the world, and so to the unity of being and the being of unity, a clue to how unity and being (as the same) are implied, a clue from an essay prefaced by Husserl’s extraordinary admission:

I have carefully read through this essay at the request of the able editors of the \textit{Kant-Studien}, and I am happy to be able to state that it contains no sentence which I could not completely accept as my own or openly acknowledge as my own conviction (Fink 2005, 178).

For Fink writes of the first of all questions, the greatest mystery of all, the mystery of the being of the world itself: ‘our human being, the latter itself implying the being of the world just as the being of the world implies the being of man’ (Fink 2005, 209; my emphasis). And here, Elverton’s translation is not ‘wrong’; it is ‘right’, but nevertheless conceals the thing itself, namely, that which Fink and Husserl and phenomenology as a whole are trying to say. For, in truth, the text reads: ‘our human being, which simultaneously in itself implies world-being, as world-being human-being [unser menschliches Sein, das zugleich Weltsein in sich impliziert, wie Weltssein Menschsein].’ In other words, implication (the second one) is implied: we imply the world and it implies us. Fink does not write, ‘world-being implies human-being’; he writes ‘world-being human-being’—that is, ‘it us’. At

\textsuperscript{37} And if friendship can serve as a clue to thinking unity, we should probably not be surprised if it implies (πρὸς) how we can think the unity (ἕν) of the world as well. For if the world is one, it is because unity is implied thereby, as well as implicated in how everything real joins together therein, how all things are given as separate or inseparable, divisible or indivisible. And this is also how the world can be constituted as the collective horizon for any possible investigation, as well as constitute any science (or art) as being one—phenomenology included.
the very moment when being is at stake, when the relation or correlation of us
and the world, the mystery of all mysteries, is in question—and the answer is that
we imply one another, that human-being and world-being are implied by each
other (at one and the same time, which implicates temporality and aspectuality
thereby)—phenomenology resorts to implication. And if ‘implies’ is here implied,
it is because Fink is demonstrating how to speak and think implication; he is
showing what the thing itself means; as well as how to do it, how to imply without
simply conforming to (the translations of) the language and logic of presence and
absence, how to be implied (like a dead friend or a ghost) who is neither present
nor absent. Thus, the unity of ‘it us’, the world and humans, the being of the world
and the being of human beings, of ‘Weltsein Menschsein’, and the being of these
beings, is implied, an implication—and its way of being one is implying, by
implication.

The third clue from Plato—or rather, from the Parmenides of the Parmenides,
and his way of thinking the unity of unity, of thinking how it is one. For he says: ἑν ἑν
(142c). And Cornford translates: ‘one [is] one’ (Plato 1985, 142c).38 But the dialogue
just says: ‘one one’. And again, the translation is not ‘wrong’, but it covers-up the
way in which the one is and is one (thereby conforming to, and complicite with, a
certain traditional concealment and a somehow motivated privileging of, and

38 Alternatively, Cornford translates: ‘One is one’ (PP, 142c). ‘Being’ lies between the one-one and the other-
one; although in Greek the word “is” (the “copula”) can be omitted, as here’ (Cornford, PP, 136n1). In fact,
implicating being is common-place throughout Greek philosophy (and literature); for example, in Plato’s Laws
(901c6-d2), ‘a single occurrence of einai provides the verb for three clauses, although in the first clause (where
the verb occurs) the syntax is absolute and the meaning existential, whereas in the second and third clauses
(where the verb is absent and must be supplied) the syntax is copulative with an adjectival predicate’ (Kahn
2003, XII11). Heraclitus (DK, 62) also uses this: ‘immortals are mortal, mortals immortal, living the others’
death, dead in the others’ life [ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοι ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸ ν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ
ἐκείνων βίον τεθνε ῶτες]’ (Kahn 1979, 71, my emphasis). But being is not there, not present in the text,
although neither is it simply absent—rather, it is implied, and the text should read: ‘immortals mortal,
mortals immortal, living the other’s death, dead in the other’s life.’ Indeed, ‘this is in point of form
Heraclitus’ masterpiece, the most perfectly symmetrical of all the fragments. The first two clauses of two
words each (with copula unexpressed [or more precisely, implied—a masterpiece of implication!] in Greek)
are mirror images, identical but for the word order: a-b-b-a’ (Kahn 1979, 216). Unfortunately—or
ironically—Plato’s Parmenides is neither simply satirical [logical exercise with a polemical purpose] nor
pedagogical [logical exercise with a positive purpose], but metaphysical. For his part, Proclus (2007-17, 64k)
ends his commentary at 142a, just before the ‘one one’—and no contemporary Plato commentaries, at least
to my knowledge, deal with this issue.
preference for, the power of presence, and absence *qua* privation)—for the being of unity is (just) implied, an implication, which is why Plato writes: ‘the existent must have the “being” *implied* in “being existent”’. But if the being of unity is implied, and if being and unity are the same (implications), then ‘one one’ means: unity must be implied as much as being. For unity is not simply present in everything that is one, nor absent therefrom; it too is implied—just as the being of unity is implied (which is the ground on which it can then be translated into the language and logic of presence-absence, interpreted and reinterpreted as the coming-to-presence and going-out-into-absence of unity *qua* accidental, true, potential-actual and categorical, and investigated as the real and ideal unities and units of the arts and sciences). And this way of being one—which is how unity is one as well, or just ‘one one’—has multiple implications: unity is not a unit (nor a whole or part, subject or predicate, substance or attribute), but it is always the unity of what is and is not one, and of itself—for it is implied, which is how anything that is one (such as us and the world) can come to presence and go out into absence, οὐσία and ἀπουσία (Plato 1985, 163c) as indivisible or divisible, inseparable or separable. Thus, unity is implied by unity as its way of being unity.

39 *PP*, 162a; my emphasis. In other words, to participate, μετέχω, μετέχονται, means to imply, to be implied; and participation is implication. Indeed, ideas are not simply separate from (or unrelated to) things; they are not in another world or space or time, so the real does not just partially or wholly participate in the ideal; rather, χωρίς as the difference which differentiates (distinguishes, divides, cuts, ὁρίζω) ideas from things, χωρίς as theirs: both are and are one, insofar as the boundary, ὁρίζω, between them belongs to both—just as day and night, separated and joined by the horizon, ὁρίζω, are ways in which light comes to presence and goes out into absence, ways in which the Sun and Earth are in relation; just as the way of truth and the way of seeming are both Parmenidean ways of thinking and speaking, acting and being (one). For each idea (or form) is ‘one and different’ from the things of which they are the idea (or form), and different from each other, which is why ‘Socrates has to clarify to himself what is *implied* in being “one”’ (Scolnicov 2003, 76; my emphasis). Thus, as Heidegger argues (against Husserl’s psychologism): it is not a matter of envisaging a gap between two worlds in order to cast a bridge over both, or solve a problem of one’s own invention, which is like trying to make a gun barrel by first taking an empty space and then wrapping steel around it; rather, it is a question of grasping implication as that which ‘makes possible both ways-of-being in their original unity’ (*GA21*, 93).

40 Examples abound. Being is implied in poetry: ‘Beauty is truth, truth [ε] beauty’ (Keats 1814-1891, 3-2, my emphasis; see also, Haas 2014). Being is implied in Russian, such as the first lines of *Notes from Underground*: Я человек больной... Я злой человек, ‘I [am] a sick man... I [am] a wicked man’ (Dostoyevski 1864, 1); and in many other languages, such as Hebrew. Being is implied in Heraclitus: ἦθος ἄνθρωποι δίψοιν (Diels
It is now, perhaps possible to respond to the question of why the world is one—because it is, and being and unity imply one another. And to the question of how the world is one—because unity is implied in and by the world, so that it can be, and so come to presence and go out into absence. And to the question of what this unity is—an implication which has its way of being implied, and implicating itself in the ways in which unity presents and represents itself. And this has implications for the onto-henological metaphysics of presence and absence which animates the history of philosophy from the Greeks to Husserl—which implicates it in the thinking and acting, imagining and sensing of any possible unity of the human and natural sciences, and the arts—for it covers up a certain way of being one, namely, being implied. But the task is to consider what is implied thereby, and how so, and the implications thereof.

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1960, B119; see also, Heidegger GA9, 336; Haas 2018b); and in Plato 1922, *Laws*, X, 901c8-d2; Kahn 2003, XIIin11. For as Heidegger reminds us: ‘language speaks’ (GA12, 243; Benjamin 1991, II.1, 144); or as Hegel writes: ‘the forms-of-thought are first set-out and put-down in human language’ (1832, xvi).
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