NOTES FOR A NEW MILLENIUM

COULD A HEALTHIER CIVILIZATION ARISE FROM THE ASHES OF MODERNITY?

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‘The philosophers have muddied all the little fountains,
But do not my strong eyes know you, far house?’
(With apologies to Walt Kelly)

‘There are nine and twenty ways of constructing tribal lays,
And--every--single--one--of--them--is--right.’

[Nietzsche’s critique of modern reason, the self-deception and dishonesty of modern naturalism, the \( \omega \)-question of natural philosophy, the Grand Myth of Scientific Superrationality, Latour and the Hidden Constitution, nonmodern nature-cultures and indigenous nature-cultures, on the need for figurative methods of reasoning]

ABSTRACT: If modern naturalism, as Bruno Latour argues, has never really been modern, then modern reason has never really been rational. Contrary to the predominant inclination to view science as the epitome of rational thinking, the would-be nonmodern naturalist in search of truly rational ways of thinking and living in a rapidly deteriorating world needs to radically revise his/her conception of good reasoning. For help in this task he might well look to allegedly ‘primitive’ indigenous nature-cultures whose deep respect for nature and all her creatures is manifested in what may deserve to be called a ‘living reason.’

KEYWORDS: Naturalism; Myth of scientific reason; Indigenous nature-cultures; Civilization

1 WOULD-BE NATURALISTS WHO ARE NOT INDIFFERENT TO THE WONDROUS COMPLEXITY OF

the world as they actually find it might do well to reflect on the premodern distinction between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. Ordinary experience daily confirms that the world is shot through with change and novelty as well as more or less stable forms of organization. It may thus be the beginning of wisdom to think of ‘reality’ in the first instance as a ‘something’ continually in process of being made and remade (*natura naturans*) and not as a more or less definite product comprised of eternal verities (*natura naturata*).

Such a view, however, indicates that nature is best conceived as eternally ‘on the move’; which puts paid to the notion of a singular natural phenomenon and indicates that the ideas of change and novelty ought to take precedence over permanence and stability. The idea of the naturing of nature, however, immediately runs up against one of the fondest assumptions of modernity which concern the excellence of the ideals of reason that are backed up by the presumably universal, eternal, and immutable ‘laws of nature’.

It is thus the near universal endorsement of the ‘rightness’ of this settled situation that lends a special poignancy to the question asked by the native Indian activist Vine Deloria Jr.:

> What is the potential for a philosophy to help us make sense of our lives? The West has certainly not solved that problem; it has only used its tremendous political and economic power to render the question moot.  

The implication is that the West is misguided in a number of ways that reflect badly on the supposedly good sense of the dominant ideals of modern reason. This thought thus comes close to blasphemy since the presumably universal, eternal, and immutable laws of nature possess a kind of semi-divine authority. But this being in conflict with the plurality of human religions prompt one to wonder whether the pervasive faith in modern reason is misplaced. In other words, it puts into question the good sense of modern naturalists who think that they have resolved the question of the meaning of rational thinking.

Believing that science is capable of establishing if not certain knowledge, at

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least as the next best thing, modern naturalists thus downgrade the affective side of thinking. At the same time they tend to dismiss the thinking of ‘primitive’ peoples who lack systematic methods of reasoning as irrational and/or superstitious. Deloria is suggesting, however, that this uncomfortable shoe could well be better fit for the modern foot. He thereby puts into question both the honesty and good will of modern naturalists. Having invested all their faith in systematic methods of reasoning, they disdain to take into account the feelings and emotions that accompany everyday living and thinking. Modern naturalists even seem to be repelled by the idea that the naturing of nature alludes to a complex dance of engaged and sentient interacting beings engaged in unchoreographed attempts to make sense of their worlds.

This situation thus puts into question the good sense of modern naturalists who believe that science relieves them of the need to do metaphysics. Hence they also feel free to ignore the wondrous mystery inherent in the very idea of meaning-making, which suggests that those indigenous peoples whose thinking allows for wonder may well have a more comprehensive grip on ‘reality.’ Being inclined to take all aspects of their concrete experiences seriously, as Deloria points out, they believe they dwell in a living cosmos. Hence unlike modern naturalists they are not inclined to play down the extreme complexity of experiencing. Indeed, they believe this has both a material and an immaterial side.

2 NOW DELORIA IS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN FINDING THE REASON FOR THE IMMENSE GULF

misunderstanding that separates Indians and non-Indians. On one side nature and all her creatures are regarded with deep respect while on the other side their existence is viewed as scarcely worth remarking upon. That this is no minor failure of interest it moreover becoming increasingly evident—which suggests that human beings have a very poor understanding of how they might best comport themselves in the worlding of the world.

However, this question of questions raises moral/ethical concerns, so one

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3‘What could be more superstitious,’ Deloria asks, ‘than to believe that the world in which we live and where we have our most intimate personal experiences is not really trustworthy and that another, mathematical world exists that represents a true reality?’ SR, p. 39.
needs to have an at least rough picture of what is actually going on in the naturing of nature in order to fit such concerns into a satisfactory picture. This requires facing up to certain possibly intractable metaphysical problems. Hence perhaps the tendency of modern naturalists not to ask the most important question of all, which is how best to do natural philosophy. For they prefer to presume that it is possible to frame within the limited domain of science adequate explanations of natural phenomena, such as Life itself.

But what if the Being of the 'really real' does not supervene over an intrinsic flightiness of Becoming? What if modern naturalists were completely mistaken in this key metaphysical assumption? How seriously, in other words, should one take a picture of the world that is gleaned from their ingenious logico-mathematical reasonings? It is not merely incidental that Deloria stresses the fact that indigenous peoples and the moderns entertain 'two entirely different perceptions of the world.' Thus perceiving two different, perhaps mutually incomprehensible 'realities,' this situation implies that the problem of perception supervenes on all the rest. Yet modern naturalists presume that they can look to science to save themselves from doing metaphysics at all, although it is hardly self-evident that science is capable of doing just to all aspects of experiencing.

In other words, the moderns may be suspected of having become subservient to what I have elsewhere called the Myth of Scientific Superrationality. It is thus a nice irony that this myth anathemizes myth itself and consigns it to the irrational side of thought. Yet it is hardly irrational of indigenous thinkers to want to take into account, as Deloria notes, all aspects of their concrete experiences. This means taking seriously not only the continual interplay of imagery and emotions in thinking. It also means attending to the significance of suggestive insights and intuitions that arise spontaneously from the unconscious side of perception. For indigenous thinkers allow for those unusual 'seeings' that are called 'visions.' Completely resistant to scientific investigation, these obscure perceptions not surprisingly require the enlistment of figurative methods of reasoning which include myths and metaphors.

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The irony is that the Grand Myth decrees that there is but one rational way to reason about natural phenomena and that is the way of science. Science moreover anathematizes mythical thinking, which bespeaks an essentially irrational dogma that is essentially incoherent. It conflicts in any case with the very raison d'être of philosophy—which is surely the aim to get a little wisdom.

It is thus perhaps small wonder that so much modern philosophy is shot through with anomalies and contradictions—just as Deloria suggests. In other words the systemic suppression of wisdom bespeaks an entrenchment of a toxic bad sense that puts into question the honesty and good will of many allegedly highly rational modern naturalists. Noone seems to have been more acutely aware of this failure of modern reason than Friedrich Nietzsche who long ago accused it of traducing reason itself. Charging modern naturalists with being mesmerized by an ‘obsessive knowledge-drive,’ Nietzsche depicted this drive as both self-serving and self-deluding. The modern conception of good reasoning, in other words, not only evades the crucial ‘problematic of sense’ that swarms with difficult problems and questions related to the vexed question of how sense is actually made. This has led to the institution of a mode of thought that is well-adapted to serving a lucrative alliance between cupidity and stupidity that has ensued.6

For Nietzsche deplores the propensity of the moderns to adopt narrow perspectives which have led educational institutions to teach a kind of stupidity. That is, a kind of unwisdom that gives the lie to the putatively ‘enlightened’ culture of the West. This much admired civilization can thus be charged not only with harbouring a systemic bad faith, one that induced Nietzsche to declare that ‘here there must be something sick.’

But he did not provide an aetiology of the disease of understanding he suspected was secretly eating the soul of this celebrated civilization. He rather indicated that modernity had fostered an unreasonable aversion to wisdom that stemmed from an over-valuation of the quest for detailed knowledge. For this quest had displaced the ancient quest for wisdom. Yet wisdom has an important role to play in would-be rational inquiry since wisdom sets limits to the search for knowledge.

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6 See my PRPS, Chapter 8 for a more extensive discussion of Nietzsche’s critique of modern reason.
The need for such limits has since become undeniable inasmuch as modern reason has fostered a very clever techno-science that in the name of rationality has produced, for instance, more than enough weapons of mass destruction to eliminate all life on earth many times over. Not to mention a euphemistically named ‘anthropogenic climate change.’

Hence when Nietzsche noted that there are many things he did not wish to know, he might have added there are many things *homo sapiens* should not seek to know since it does not possess wisdom enough to deal with them sensibly and responsibly. The banishment of the notion of wisdom from would-be rational discourse, in other words, was no minor fault since it led to a global spread of an anti-empirical empiricism wedded to an anti-rational rationalism of a kind that Deloria suggests most indigenous cultures have escaped.

So I should make it clear that I am not implying that science is essentially wrong-headed, let alone inherently pernicious. Nor am I denying that scientists at their best tend to be careful and conscientious investigators with a talent for gathering important evidence as to how the world is actually going. What I am claiming, in short, is that scientistic thinkers do not as a rule make good metaphysicians and this is an important, perhaps vital consideration.

That is to say, the conception of good reasoning promoted by the champions of an increasingly influential techno-science reveals its limitations when it comes to providing an adequately comprehensive understanding of what the human animal needs to know—how to comport itself reasonably and responsibly in a world that is forever ‘moving on.’ I am suggesting that the would-be naturalist might usefully begin again by closely attending to the reasonings of indigenous thinkers. This requires overcoming what seems a deeply embedded aversion in this culture to metaphysical speculation. Indeed, metaphysics is frequently conflated with mysticism, which is not entirely wrong-headed if, as many indigenous thinkers believe, the world is the scene of an unresolvable mystery.

But one can say that the meaning of ‘rational’ has not only been hi-jacked by scientistic naturalists, it has been twisted out of shape to suit the less than noble ambitions of modern naturalists and their ethically challenged followers. For it is anything but incidental that Deloria cites Rising Sun who notes that the ‘old Indians’ were primarily

interested in finding the proper moral and ethical road upon which human beings
should walk. All knowledge, if it is to be useful, was directed toward that goal. Absent in this approach was the idea that knowledge existed apart from human beings and their communities, and could stand alone for "its own sake". 7

Thus when Deloria speaks of the barrier that prevents fruitful communications between indigenous peoples and the moderns, he is not only referring to two entirely different perceptions of the world. He is especially conscious of the fact that the modern side is "seriously deficient in moral/ethical sensibilities." 8 Yet he nonetheless believes that the gap between the modern and indigenous views of the world is slowing closing, which implies that the former is catching up to the latter; not the other way round.

Perhaps modernity is even gradually becoming wiser and more just despite its tendency to invest anti-metaphysical beliefs with an unwarranted authority, such as those that silently support the evolutionary doctrine of neo-Darwinism--which arguably attempts to force the problem of the emergence of human moral/ethical concerns into the Procrustean bed of natural selection.

So it is more than incidental that many indigenous peoples believe that the proper goal in the human journey through life is not the accumulation of wealth and secular power but rather the getting of a little wisdom. An awareness of this consideration alone might have ameliorated the damage done by Eurocentric imperialists who claimed the right to usurp the lands and resources of native peoples the whole world over. Ostensibly aiming to "civilize" the 'savages' they visited uninvited, they might even have paused to ponder the meaning of civilization itself.

The supposedly "enlightened" West, in other words, might have long ago adopted a truly civilized attitude towards the naturing of nature had they pondered the respectful attitudes of indigenous peoples towards nature and all her creatures. They appear instead to have set the cosmic stage for the advent of a new dark age. For the proponents of modern reason who celebrate the relentless 'progress' of techno-science should have at least noticed the wisdom of indigenous peoples who, after all, have managed to survive in often extremely difficult circumstances for centuries. Modernity has, by way of contrast, managed in a comparatively short time to render the whole Earth hostage to a mode of thought.

7 SR, pp. 43-44.
8 MME, p. vii.
that induced Nietzsche to urge philosophy to produce 'cultural physicians' who would work for a better time to come. But he might have more aptly called for 'cultural therapists' since the kind of sickness he exposes resembles a cultural form of schizophrenia. But if this is so, a complete recovery from the toxicity of modern reason may be impossible without a radical rethinking of the aims, ideals, and function of modern reason, not to mention the putatively universal, eternal, and immutable 'laws of nature.'

3 MODERNITY MUST CURE ITSELF, IN OTHER WORDS, OF THE FALSE DREAM OF A PURE REASON

which lends legitimacy to a kind of double-think, as Bruno Latour argues.9 Protected from the need for reform by a hidden Constitution that allows what it disallows, science-obsessed modern naturalists propagate powerful 'hybrids' of nature and culture (such as the genome in biological science) which greatly extend the control of hegemon-seeking moderns. This Constitution blithely covers over the elementary fact that there is no way to speak about a 'natural entity' that is not obliged to draw upon the three resources of nature, culture, and discourse. Hence in urging this basic truth, Latour favours the term 'nonmodern' over either 'anti-modern' or 'post-modern'---since the latter two designations tend to preserve one of the most serious faults of modern reason---which is the tendency to treat nature and culture as though they could be studied independently of one another.

The would-be nonmodern naturalist, in other words, might well begin again by first conceiving her/himself as an investigator already embedded in a specific nature-culture. Such is the case with indigenous thinkers who appear never to have been tempted to divide nature from culture in the first place. Hence the importance of Nietzsche's claim that the problem of good reasoning is as much cultural in character as it is intellectual. The interpretative side of attempts at naturalistic explanation thus oblige the would-be nonmodern naturalist to face up to the very tricky question of what might be the best way to do natural philosophy. This is a question that involves, as Deloria points out, finding a way to unify and synthesize the most valuable intuitions and insights into how the

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world actually goes that have no doubt arisen in many areas of inquiry. The truly rational nonmodern naturalist, in other words, cannot avoid confronting directly the problematic of sense which consists of both metaphysical and rhetorical problems that revolve about question of the meaning of good sense.

4 HENCE THE FIRST LESSON THE WOULD-BE NONMODERN NATURALIST MUST LEARN

concerns the very sticky question of how to judge the worth of possibly valuable insights and intuitions. This question is hardly a simple one since it involves the puzzle of how to accommodate the fact that experiencing often involves experiences having an immaterial character. That it may simply have been disastrous for the moderns to brush off this consideration as irrelevant is in fact explicitly urged by a company of indigenous thinkers who declare that

[the traditional Native peoples hold the key to the reversal of the process in western civilization which holds the promise of unimaginable future suffering and destruction. Spiritualism is the highest form of political consciousness. And we, the Native Peoples of the Western Hemisphere, are among the world's surviving proprietors of that kind of consciousness. We are here to impart that message.]

Indeed, when Deloria concludes that nothing less will do than a 'fundamental revolution in the manner in which we think,' he notes that this ought to involve looking closely at 'our species traditional way of recording and remembering experiences.' But then we land in the midst of a tangle of difficult problem since it appears that traditional ways of thinking indicate that the imaginal side of thinking is the most important one.

Indeed, Jameke Highwater holds that indigenous thinkers are especially

\[\text{\textsuperscript{10}}\text{ From a position paper of the Six Nations presented at Geneva to the Non-Governmental Organization of the United Nations, 1977; quoted by Jamake Highwater, } \textit{The Primal Mind: Vision and Reality in Indian America} \text{(New York: Penguin, 1982, hereafter referred to as PM)}, \text{p. 202. Alluding to the possible imminent collapse of Western civilization, Highwater speaks of a general sense of alienation in both Indian and non-Indian societies which are currently struggling with a 'contemporary awareness of rootlessness.' However, native peoples, he suggests, 'have a certain advantage in their quest for identity' (p. 203) because they have on the whole preserved their fundamental 'otherness' (p. 14); that is, they have not entirely rejected the 'old ways' of 'seeing' that bespeak a sense of connectedness and an intimate relationship with the whole of nature. Furthermore, they tend to respect difference itself, which puts them distinctly at odds with many self-consciously 'civilized' cultures.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{11}}\text{MME, p. 211.}\]
interested in the play of imagery in their dreams as well as their visions. The implication is that traditional ways of thinking were most at home in the realm of the imaginal and not the realm of the conceptual, as the moderns would have it.\textsuperscript{12} This suggests that not only would it be irrational to attempt to suppress the use of myths and metaphors in reasoning, it may be only well-nurtured powers of imagination that can safely negotiate a drama involving any meetings and minglings of the material and immaterial powers that drive the naturing of nature. The situation has suddenly taken a quantum leap in respect to complexity. So it is enough to note here that the sort of revolution that Deloria envisages may have to await a time when the moderns have learned not only how to use non-systematic methods of reasoning when attempting to straighten out the mysteriously crooked business of thinking. They may also need to learn how to justly balance the creative/critical powers that imaginal thinking presupposes, which is an activity that Highwater suggests requires a type of education that strives to develop aesthetic feelings in the young, feelings of the sort that suffuse the thinking of modern artists.

The modern faith that science can explain everything worth explaining thus stands in sharp contrast to the beliefs of many indigenous thinkers who hold that the main goal in journeying through life is the getting of a little wisdom. There are few notions, however, which are more vague than that of wisdom. But then again this should not be a problem for anyone who is aware that vagueness and ambiguity are common features of all natural languages. It is a nice irony, in other words, that the moderns themselves have shown that these characteristics cannot be expunged by rigorous, systematic or logicistic means as though they were enemies of rational thought.\textsuperscript{13}

Apart from indicating there is no way to escape from the need for figurative methods of reasoning, the abortive logicistic campaign to defeat a phantom enemy surely attests to the value of getting a little wisdom. So it is also worth noting that every creature of nature is essentially involved in this general aim, for is not mere survival in an unpredictable and dangerous world a sign of natural

\textsuperscript{12} See \textit{The Primal Mind}, esp. Chapt. II.

\textsuperscript{13} Briefly, a good many illustrious modern philosophers have striven in vain to vanquish these common characteristics of natural languages as though they were enemies of rational thought. See my \textit{Myths of Reason}, esp. Chapter 3.
wisdom?

One might even suppose that the worlding of the world refers to a vast cosmic experiment in meaning-making that is guided by a vague and pervasive desire for wisdom. No doubt this allusion to a cosmic telos is extremely vague and highly conjectural; but then no telos need presuppose a definite goal anyway, especially if it allows for a factor of creativity. Hence the fact that indigenous nature-cultures have not developed systematic methods of reasoning is hardly a sign of ‘primitivity.’ On the contrary, given that this supposedly highly rational nature-culture called the West has managed in a comparatively short time to blithely undermine the conditions for life on the entire planet, indigenous peoples ought at least to be given credit for hanging on to the notion of wisdom.

5 HAVING LEARNED AT AN EARLY AGE TO PUT MY FAITH IN THE MYTH OF SCIENTIFIC SUPERRATIONALITY

Superrationality, I only began to think of the implications of the above convoluted line of thought when I became acquainted with the interpretation problem in quantum physics. For science itself has dramatically underscored the indispensability of the factor of interpretation in naturalistic explanations. This consideration leads to the question, however, of what to make of the persistence of the desire to adopt the language of ‘classical’ physics when trying to convey the significance of certain ‘bizarre’ findings in quantum physics. Here a good many intellectual somersaults have been turned in vain by frequent attempts to employ the standard terms of the ‘classical’ language of Newtonian physics. The upshot is that at the microphysical level of ‘reality’ all that has been made clear is that the Grand Myth has the power to prevent the moderns from realizing that the quest for an adequate understanding of the world has a vital metaphysical dimension.

Scientists have instead busied themselves with constructing convoluted scientific ‘explanations’ that resemble very fragile houses of cards—-it would seem in many cases with the intent of advancing professional status rather than understanding how the world actually goes.\(^{14}\) The irony is that quantum physics

\(^{14}\) Perhaps there is no greater evidence for a tendency to elevate especially gifted scientists to the status of minor gods than the fact that Stephen Hawking’s abstruse book on cosmology, \textit{A Brief History of Time}, has been described as the most unread best-seller of all times, second perhaps only to the Bible.
also lends support to Deloria’s claim that developments in modern science show that ‘we are returning to the ancient manner of thinking in which all the contents of experience are integrated in a single descriptive language.’ Suggesting that such a language is one that everyone would be capable of understanding, he thus invites the consideration that one of the major faults of modern reason is that which Whitehead calls the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.

He suggests that the most pernicious aspect of modern naturalism is the dubious tendency to invest highly abstract concepts with unwarranted metaphysical significance. If this is so, Nietzsche’s accusations that modern reason puts first what ought to come last presages Whitehead’s complaint that the moderns have a propensity to get many things back to front. Such dubious practices I am claiming can only be justified by appealing to a dubious myth.

Having begun in my *Myths of Reason* to explore this anomaly, I was led to wonder just what systematic methods of reasoning actually contribute to understanding the world. It is of course clear that mathematical theories are remarkably efficacious in respect to revealing the kind of physical structuring that infuses the worlding of the world. But if indigenous thinkers are right in believing that this kind of structuring is inseparable from psychical forms of structuring, the aim to frame a comprehensive understanding of the naturing of nature has dual task. That is, it must be able to do justice at once to the material and the non-material sides of experiencing. If this is so Nietzsche’s observation that serious thinking inevitably enlists

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\text{a mobile army of metaphors, metonymics, anthropomorphisms—} \text{in short a sum of} \\
\text{human relations which, poetically and rhetorically intensified, become transposed} \\
\text{and adorned, and which after long usage by a people seem fixed, canonical and} \\
\text{binding on them,}^{16}
\]

seems highly relevant. For he herewith evokes a culturally inflected drama of meaning-making that involves various non-systematic modes of reasoning, which suggests that there may be no alternative. What is needed in that case is an artful kind of reasoning that puts imagination close to center of natural philosophy.

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\(^{15}\text{MME, p. 211. Deloria holds that ‘the epistemology that emerges from modern physics is extremely compatible with the way in which many traditions think, speak, and derive both cultural values and rules for governing society.’}^{16}\text{See J. P. Stern, *Nietzsche* (Glasgow: Fontana Books, 1978), pp. 136-146.}\)
What this implies is perhaps implicit in the claim of one of Nietzsche's most illustrious admirers, Gilles Deleuze, who in the preface to *Difference and Repetition* muses on the possibility that

the time is coming when it will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy as it has been doing for so long: 'Ah! the old style...'

As for how to envisage this 'new style,' Deleuze likens the history of philosophy to a *collage* in painting. He thereby suggests that the need to find a way to synthesize apparently important insights and intuitions requires a figurative kind of reasoning that answers the ever-burning question of how best to do natural philosophy. For a *collage* in painting is a diverse but unified assemblage of significant images; that is, it exemplifies a kind of unity that is the hall-mark of 'good art.'

Thus Deleuze and Nietzsche intimate that it is essential to fashion an artful reason that can guide an adventurer bold enough to venture into the vast and unknown problematic of sense. This means however, choosing a 'good' metaphysical imaginary that can effectively unify and synthesize relevant insights and intuitions in a manner similar to the various ways one can go about unifying and synthesizing a set of possibly relevant images when attempting to construct a *collage* in painting.

This implies, in other words, that a good account of the naturing of nature need no longer pretend that the function of reason is to provide a bulwark against anarchic tendencies in thinking. The best sort of reasoning may well be one that helps show why imagination is indispensable to the quest for good reasoning. Indeed, Nietzsche is not, as J. P. Stern points out, referring to a kind of thinking that is 'esoteric or marginal.' He is rather referring to 'a human activity par excellence: it is creative existence.' This allusion to the centrality of creative imagination in natural philosophy may in fact carry over to the naturing of nature. For it elicits a kind of creative power that is as much involved in the

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7 Gilles Deleuze (1968), *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Deleuze is especially critical of the pervasive 'dogmatic image of thought' which restricts the movements of reason to a strictly delimited 'world of representation.'


9 Stern, p. 146.
inherent freedom of thought as in the production of novel forms of organization in the evolution of nature.

In any case, the would-be nonmodern naturalist cannot hope for a definitive answer to the burning question of how to do natural philosophy. He/she can only hope to fashion a good 'literary-philosophical' way of reasoning that is akin to the sort of 'goodness' that indigenous people believe is nurtured through the telling of stories. Or that sort of goodness which Nietzsche elicits when he hints that the best natural philosophy may be akin to the 'great texts' of literature which also enlist mobile armies of figurative methods of reasoning.

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